In the second post in a Renforce special series on the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), Thomas Verellen looks at the regulation – which applies as of today – from the angle of democratic accountability. In response to geopolitical unrest, the global expansion of state capitalism, and the climate crisis, the EU has significantly strengthened the European Commission’s unilateral trade policy toolbox. How the Commission can be held democratically accountable as it starts to yield its newfound powers, he argues, should be top of mind for everybody concerned about the democratic credentials of the European Union. The FSR cannot be seen in isolation from this broader context.

Read more

By Thomas Verellen

On 8 October 2020 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rendered judgment in an appeal procedure against the General Court judgment in the case of  Bank Refah Kargaran (T‑552/15 and C-134/19 P). The case concerned an appeal, by the Iranian Refah Kargaran bank, against a number of Council decisions and regulations imposing restrictive measures (sanctions) on the Iranian bank. Some of these decisions had been adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU, and others on the basis of Article 215 TFEU (the latter served to implement the former, as is customary in the field of restrictive measures). Bank Refah Kargaran challenged the Council’s decision inter alia on the grounds that the Council had not properly motivated its decisions. In a judgment issued on 6 September 2013, the General Court had agreed with that argument and had proceeded to annul the above decisions and regulations in so far as they concerned the Iranian bank. 

Read more

By Thomas Verellen

Covid-19 represents a shock to global capital flows. As companies see the value of their assets tumble, they may become attractive targets to foreign investors – in particular, state-backed foreign investors less exposed to the economic fallout of the pandemic. To address what has been described as ‘opportunistic investment behaviour’ and – less euphemistically – ‘predatory buying’ practices, jurisdictions with well-established foreign investment screening mechanisms such as Australia and Canada have tightened scrutiny: the Australian government has reduced the value threshold for screening of all foreign investments to zero dollars, and the government of Canada has announced it will subject public health related investments and all investments by state-owned investors, regardless of their sector of activity, to enhanced scrutiny. 

For the European Union, Covid-19 came at an interesting time. The EU recently introduced its own FDI screening framework – a mechanism which leaves the ultimate decision-making power over individual investments with Member State screening authorities, but which sets up a framework for cooperation between EU and Member State authorities. The framework will go live on 11 October 2020 and thus was not operational when the pandemic hit in the spring of 2020. Against this backdrop, this blog post explores how the EU has responded to the Covid-19 crisis and in particular to the aforementioned risk of predatory buying that flows from the pandemic’s impact on asset prices. Given the multi-level set up of the EU’s approach to FDI screening, an analysis of the EU response to this risk needs to take into account developments at both the EU and Member State levels. This blog post focusses on the EU side of the equation. 

Read more